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ABSTRACT
Privacy has deteriorated in the world wide web ever since the 1990s.
The tracking of browsing habits by different third-parties has been
at the center of this deterioration. Web cookies and so-called web
beacons have been the classical ways to implement third-party
tracking. Due to the introduction of more sophisticated technical
tracking solutions and other fundamental transformations, the use
of classical image-based web beacons might be expected to have lost
their appeal. According to a sample of over thirty thousand images
collected from popular websites, this paper shows that such an
assumption is a fallacy: classical 1×1 images are still commonly used
for third-party tracking in the contemporary world wide web.While
it seems that ad-blockers are unable to fully block these classical
image-based tracking beacons, the paper further demonstrates that
even limited information can be used to accurately classify the third-
party 1 × 1 images from other images. An average classification
accuracy of 0.956 is reached in the empirical experiment. With these
results the paper contributes to the ongoing attempts to better
understand the lack of privacy in the world wide web, and the
means by which the situation might be eventually improved.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the early days of the Internet the term “web bug” referred to
simple techniques with which unobtrusive user tracking was imple-
mented in the world wide web. Together with web cookies, which
were first standardized in 1997, these web bugs were an important
historical factor shaping the developments that have continued to
deteriorate privacy in the world wide web for two decades [22, 42].
Typically these web bugs were one-pixel-by-one-pixel images em-
bedded to a given website but hosted from a different third-party
website. These image-based characteristics also introduced con-
cepts such as “invisible image”, “tracking pixel”, “invisible pixel”,
and “pixel tag” into the rubric of popular Internet discourse. The
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tracking itself was technically simple. When a user visited a website
with a web bug, the loading of the image then delivered tracking
information to the associated third-party once the user’s client re-
trieved the image. This simple mechanism for client-side tracking
is essentially the same today as it was about two decades ago.
The web advertisement industry and associates managed to later
brand the term web bug with the more positive “web beacon” term.
The same parties were also busy developing more sophisticated
tracking techniques throughout the decades. The examples include
so-called browser fingerprinting, multi-device identification, track-
ing through local storage and caching, canvas-based tracking, and
Flash cookies [11, 21]. Given the traditionally extensive lobbying at
the World Wide Web Consortium [14, 24], also many standardiza-
tion initiatives have been proposed as alternatives to image-based
web beacons. For instance, a ping attribute has been introduced for
<a> tags in order to make tracking easier; when a user clicks a hy-
perlink, a hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) POST request is sent
to the destination specified in the attribute. Analogously, a whole
application programming interface has recently been proposed for
web beacons [41]. Furthermore, the functionality of most popular
websites nowadays depend on numerous third-parties [5, 32]. Im-
ages, multimedia content, fonts, JavaScript libraries, style sheets,
and many other web resources are commonly hosted on different
third-party domains and delivered via content delivery networks.
All these fundamental transformations would lead one to expect
that traditional image-based web beacons would have long-lost
their appeal for third-party tracking. Already because most cur-
rent websites load tens of web resources from third-parties and
JavaScript provides overwhelming functionalities, the rationale for
image-based beacons seems somewhat senseless in the contempo-
rary world wide web. Once upon a time, invisible images had a
web development function for styling websites [36], but those days
are long gone. However, the forthcoming results show that this
reasoning is false. The following three contributions are thus made:
(1) Excluding some rare exceptions [8, 17], there exists a very
limited amount of empirical research on classical 1 × 1 third-
party tracking images; the paper presents the supposedly
first measurement study concentrating solely on this topic.
(2) In contrary to prior expectations, the paper shows that image-
based web beacons are still quite frequently used in 2018.
(3) The paper demonstrates that third-party 1 × 1 images can
be classified with a high accuracy even with limited data.
The structure of the paper’s remainder is simple: the empirical
results are presented in Section 2 and briefly discussed in Section 3.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
8.
07
29
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
Y]
  2
2 A
ug
 20
18
2 RESULTS
The forthcoming results are disseminated in three straightforward
steps: a brief elaboration of the dataset is followed by a few descrip-
tive statistics, after which the classification results are presented.
2.1 Data
The dataset is based on the Alexa’s ranking of the top-500 most
popular websites in the global Internet [2]. While often used in
Internet measurement research [1, 4, 12, 37], the list is small for
probing image-based beacons. For this reason, (a) the sampling
procedure was implemented by visiting all hyperlinks present in the
primary web pages of the domains in the top-500 list, provided that
these shared the same second-level domain names. These additional
visits based on the href attributes of the <a> tags were thenmapped
back to the domain names in the Alexa’s list. It is important to
further note that (b) all queries were initiated with plain HTTP, but
(c) all redirections were followed. Following existing research [31,
33], (d) all queries were made with a custom JavaScript-capable
WebKit/Qt-powered web browser, and (e) a 30 second timeout was
used for each query in order to ensure that full contents were
loaded. Finally, (f) the top-500 list was processed three times to
rule out temporary network failures. The point about JavaScript is
particularly important because many web beacons either require
JavaScript or these are only visible for queries made with JavaScript.
For instance, a fairly typical way for trying to hide image-based
beacons is to use a zero-width and zero-height <frame> to which
numerous image-based beacons are embedded with <img> tags.
Images were collected with HTTP GET requests from the <img>
tags present in the web pages visited. Only images with unique
cryptographic hashes were qualified to the sample on per-website
basis. Thus: if a website referenced the same image with multiple
<img> tags, the corresponding image is counted only once for this
particular website. In terms of parsing, a library [15] for identifying
multipurpose Internet mail extension (MIME) types was used to
deduce about the scalable vector graphics (SVG) format. Images
with MIME types other than image/svg and image/svg+xml were
then passed to another library [6], and qualified to the analysis
if the library recognized the images. An image is then defined as
“invisible” when both the width and height equal one pixel. For SVG
images, invisibility is defined to occur when the width and height
attributes in the <svg> tags are equal or less than one.
The src attribute in a <img> tag is essential for deducingwhether
an invisible 1 × 1 image is used for tracking. While the so-called
same-origin policy [33, 35] could be used also for this task, a more
relaxed definition is adopted: an image is defined as “cross-domain”
when the second-level domain name extracted from the uniform
resource locator (URL) in the src attribute differs from the second-
level domain name of the web page visited. As redirections are
followed, the comparison is done according to the visited (and not
requested) pages. Although the definition is a simplification [5], it
is commonly used [10, 32] and adequate for the paper’s purposes.
2.2 Descriptive Statistics
In total, about 98% of the five hundred domains sampled were suc-
cessfully queried. These queries resulted over 30 thousand images
collected from <img> tags alone. From these, only a few were 1 × 1
images. The absolute amounts are deceiving, however. From the
488 domains successfully queried, as many as 149, or about 31%, in-
cluded at least one invisible image. The numerical details shown in
Table 1 indicate that not all of these were used for third-party track-
ing, however. About 27% of the URLs in the src attributes of the
<img> tags referencing 1 × 1 images do not satisfy the given cross-
domain definition. As there is little reason to nowadays use invisible
images for purposes other than tracking, it is highly probable that
this subset is used for “cross-subdomain” tracking across complex
web deployments. The logic of tracking remains the same either
way, but in these cases “the third party is also a first party” [23]
because a same entity controls the subdomains. When tracking
clients visiting example.com, beacons may be sent to a dedicated
tracker.example.com, for instance. Another point to make from
Table 1 is that the share of cross-domain images is roughly com-
parable to the share of cross-domain 1 × 1 images. In other words,
images are commonly hosted on third-party domains in general.
Table 1: Sample Characteristics
Domains sampled successfully 488
All images from <img> tags 30572
• From which cross-domain images 17760
• From which 1 × 1 images 324
• From which 1 × 1 cross-domain images 235
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Share (%)
image/jpeg
image/png
image/gif
image/svg
image/svg+xml
image/webp % across all images in the sample
% across cross-domain 1x1 images
Figure 1: MIME Types of the Images
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Figure 2: Images Across Alexa’s Top-500 Domain Categories
TheMIME types summarized in Fig. 1 show no big surprises. The
JPEG standard is the most common one for images in general, while
most of the cross-domain 1× 1 images are delivered in the graphics
interchange format (GIF). That said, also the portable network
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Figure 3: The Top-Fifteen Referencing Domains and Refer-
enced Second-Level Domains for 1×1 Cross-Domain Images
graphics (PNG) format was used for a few of the invisible images.
A similar breakdown according to the Alexa’s genre categories for
the top-500 websites is more interesting (see Fig. 2). Although the
media industry in general and newspaper websites in particular
are often seen as particularly problematic for privacy due to the
extensiveness of web advertisements [9, 31, 37, 39], the shopping
genre attains the highest relative shares of both images and invisible
images in the sample. Pornography websites expectedly contain
many images, although the share of cross-domain 1×1 images is on
a par with the sample average. The genres for arts and computers
as well as popular regional websites are also noteworthy for their
heavy use of image-based cross-domain beacons. The science genre
attains the lowest relative share in the sample.
Before turning into the classification results, it is illuminating
to take a peek at the domains using image-based beacons and the
third-party domains from which these are loaded by clients. The
left-hand side plot in Fig. 3 explains the large share of cross-domain
1 × 1 images in the shopping genre; many of the e-commerce sites
are using multiple invisible images. Even though websites related to
science are only infrequently using image-based beacons, it is worth
pointing out the outlier pointing to the website of the American
Psychological Association (APA). When turning to the right-hand
side plot, it is evident that many of the conventional big players
are using image-based beacons. The examples include Amazon,
WordPress.com, Google, and LinkedIn, as well as many well-known
web advertisement companies and their trackers. While Facebook
has long been on the spotlight for its JavaScript-based beacons [43],
the results indicate that the company is using also traditional image-
based tracking. All in all, these descriptive observations provide a
good basis for defining features for classification.
2.3 Classification Results
The supervised learning experiment is implemented by classify-
ing the 235 cross-domain 1 × 1 tracking images against all other
images collected. As the setup is highly unbalanced (see Table 1),
the experiment is carried out by random under-sampling from the
majority class of normal, non-invisible images. While many alter-
natives are available [38], this basic under-sampling works well
enough in many applied problems. Thus, a 10-fold cross-validation
is carried out for 250 random balanced samples. Arithmetic mean
and standard deviation are used for reporting the results. A readily
available decision-tree classifier [29] is used for the computation.
Table 2: Features for Classification
Name Description
QURL True if a query field is present in a URL for an image.
QDOM True if QURL is true and any of the referencing do-
mains (cf. Fig. 3) appear in a query field of an URL.
UNUM Number of numbers (0, . . . , 9) appearing in an URL.
CORG True if an image’s URL is not only cross-domain but
also cross-origin with respect to a sampled domain.
BLCK True if an image’s URL would be blocked by an ad-
blocker [30] according to an offline parser [16].
AALT True if an alt attribute is present in a <img> tag.
ASTY True if a style attribute is present in a <img> tag.
ETAG True if an Etag field is set in a HTTP response.
COOK True if a Set-Cookie is set in a HTTP response.
NOCH True if no-cache, no-store, or must-revalidate is
specified for a Cache-Control in a HTTP response.
MAGE If present, the max-age value specified for a
Cache-Control HTTP response field; −1 otherwise.
MIME A dummy variable for five MIME types in Fig. 1
DTOP A dummy variable for the top-5 referenced domains,
as listed in descending order in the plot (b) in Fig. 3.
The features used for the classification experiment are enumer-
ated in Table 2. These can be grouped analytically into four cate-
gories. The first category deals with the URLs extracted from the
src attributes of the <img> tags used in the websites successfully
sampled. These features are easy to justify based on existing re-
search. For instance, the presence of a query field (QURL) is often
associated with cross-origin JavaScript content prone to change
temporally [33]. Another example would UNUM, which approxi-
mates the prevalence of identifiers embedded to URLs. Although
reverse engineering is difficult, such identifiers are presumably
used for tracking unique clients, users, or both [13, 23]. Also the
second group of features convey a clear rationale. For instance,
there is little reason beyond obfuscation to specify an alt attribute
for an invisible image. In contrast, a style attribute may be used
to additionally specify that “width: 1px; height: 1px” or that
“display: none !important”. The third group contains five fea-
tures that are all based on the HTTP header responses that were
received upon retrieving the images based on GET requests. The
rationale is again relatively clear-cut. As an example: to be efficient,
image-based tracking beacons should disable client-side caching;
hence, ETAG and NOCH should be false and true, respectively. The
fourth and final group contains two features that both expand to
sets of dummy variables. The dummy variables for the MIME types
should provide some discriminate power due to the distribution
shown in Fig. 1. For instance, performance should clearly improve
with the dummy variable that takes a value one for image/gif-
based images and zero otherwise. The five dummy variables used
for the DTOP feature are included as additional statistical controls.
Given these notes, the results are summarized in Table 3. The
first panel indicates that BLCK and DTOP alone hardly improve the
classification performance. (Due to the under-sampling, a random
classifier attains an accuracy rate of 0.5.) This observation pro-
vides weak support for existing results regarding the inadequacy
of most ad-blockers particularly when the context is expanded to-
ward client-side tracking in general [37, 39]. This point applies
particularly to the so-called EasyList [30] used to define the BLCK
feature [3, 9, 25, 44]. When all features from Table 2 are included,
however, the average accuracy is as high as 0.956. Given the limited
information used, this level of classification performance is excep-
tionally good. With more features and larger datasets to learn from,
accuracy could be probably pushed even toward the 0.99 range.
Table 3: Classification Results
BLCK and DTOP only All features
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Recall 0.569 0.046 0.956 0.030
Precision 0.669 0.101 0.958 0.029
Accuracy 0.569 0.046 0.956 0.030
As the ratio of cross-domain 1 × 1 images to all images may
not be stable when also less popular domains are sampled, further
empirical experiments are required, however. Due to the general
limitations of domain name popularity lists [34], it should be re-
marked that merely scanning a larger list does not solve the root
issue. The results reportedmay also contain some inaccuracies since
the so-called public suffix list [26] was not used for domain name
comparisons. As it is unclear what the suffixes mean in terms of the
domain name system, the use of the list remains debatable, however.
Although empirical observations indicate otherwise [9], it may be
also possible that dynamically generated web content delivered to
a client vary according to the client’s geographic location. A more
fundamental question is whether the cross-domain definition used
makes sense because the actual delivery is often close to the client
due to content delivery networks [32]. It is a much bigger question
whether and to which extent such “third-party” networks conduct
client tracking and profiling. However, surveillance rather than
privacy is arguably a better concept for approaching this question.
3 DISCUSSION
Classical cross-domain 1 × 1 image beacons are still frequently
used in the world wide web. Even limited information and a basic
machine learning approach can classify such images to a very high
level of accuracy. While these observations are interesting and
noteworthy on their own right, these allow to also contemplate a
little about the state of the current web privacy research.
Much of the research in the domain—including this paper—has
been preoccupied with demonstrations that different forms of third-
party tracking are prevalent. Another common topic has been the
(in)efficiency of ad-blockers to counter such tracking. Although
these empirical demonstrations are important from a viewpoint
of regulation and policy-making [7], less attention has been given
for engineering innovative countermeasures. The lack of robust
countermeasures may also explain the continuing use of invisible
tracking images. Although there may be technical reasons to prefer
these images for email tracking [8], arguably only the human imag-
ination limits the amount of plausible alternatives for web tracking.
Against this backdrop, the explanation for the use of invisible im-
ages and other “legacy techniques” may be simple: why deprecate
something that already works? Another explanation may be that
these techniques provide a “backup solution” for countering simple
countermeasures such as per-website JavaScript restrictions.
Even though some skepticism has been expressed about machine
learning approaches [25], the classification results presented are
promising. These also support existing observations about high
accuracy rates in the ad-blocking context [3, 17, 20, 28]. Although
an early machine learning application was published already almost
two decades ago [18], practically all of the ad-blocking solutions in
day-to-day use are based on blacklists, messy regular expressions,
and manual maintenance. The drawbacks are thus clear. Obviously,
classifying invisible images provides only a very limited viewpoint
on third-party tracking, but, on the other hand, the same goes for the
commonly examined third-party JavaScript content referenced with
<script> tags. In general, the problem is that practically all web
elements that allow referencing external content may be used for
third-party tracking. Many of these elements allow to also reference
further external resources; URLs can be embedded to style sheets,
JavaScript to SVG images, and so forth.
Thus, it seems futile to even try to win the race about new track-
ing techniques. Instead, a potential machine learning approach for
privacy-conscious users might be much simpler: it might be possi-
ble to build a reasonable training set with existing ad-blocking lists
and other common countermeasures, and then simply instrument
all cross-domain HTTP requests made within a browser. For such
users, some amount of false positives is acceptable, and per-website
exceptions can be always added through a user interface.
A further gap in the current web privacy research relates to the
limited understanding on the effectiveness of personalized web ad-
vertisements and third-party tracking in general. In this regard, the
situation is somewhat paradoxical for practical privacy research: to
engineer machine learning solutions for better privacy protection,
a better understanding is required about the efficiency of current
tracking solutions, which, in turn, requires (reverse) engineering
privacy-violating prototypes. For instance, browser fingerprinting
might be countered with random shuffling of user-agent strings,
small jitter introduced to the font and screen sizes announced by a
browser, and other types of randomization [19, 27]. But before im-
plementing such solutions for actual users, a better understanding
is required about the effectiveness of current browser fingerprinting
techniques used in the wild. While progress has been made [40],
many of the questions are still unclear particularly when extended
to fingerprinting beyond browsers. Finally, it remains worth asking
whether the current web privacy research is seeing the forest for
the trees? Do new tracking techniques matter in practice when the
authors of this paper are likely identifiable with a few web beacons,
Internet protocol addresses, and search engine histories?
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